ISRAELI GAS MASK CREEPY FULL

First of all there was a drawdown of staff, people could leave voluntarily if they wanted to. Reich, during November or December, and of course all we talked about was what Saddam and Israel would do.ĭuring that period, of course, we had, inside the embassy and consulate, our own long buildup. I recall setting up a program for my FSI (Foreign Service Institute) professor, Dr. December 1990 was particularly interesting, with lots of threats around and lots of speculation, but we continued to operate normally in the ACC (American Cultural Center). There was a long run up to the Gulf War, you may recall. We know how it all came out, now, so that’s fine and dandy, but nobody knew what was going to happen at the time. It is not related to the intifada in any way, but certainly was something that got our attention at the time.ĭU CHATEAU: Oh, immediately and completely. “They suddenly realized that they were Americans.”īut I think more vivid in my memory, certainly, is the first Gulf War. Please support our efforts to continue capturing, preserving, and sharing the experiences of America’s diplomats. Read about Du Chateau and other FSOs’ experiences with “honeypots” HERE.ĭrafted by Sophie May ADST relies on the generous support of our members and readers like you. Read about the start of the Gulf War HERE.

ISRAELI GAS MASK CREEPY FULL

Read Du Chateau’s full oral history HERE. Du Chateau lived through all the precautions put in the place by the Israeli government, and he also experienced first hand the fear of the local population.Īt various other points in his career, Du Chateau served in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Finland.ĭu Chateau’s interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 18, 2011. Despite the State Department giving him the option to return to the United States, Du Chateau decided to remain in Jerusalem, where he believed he was safe from Hussein’s missiles. Foreign Service Officer Philippe Du Chateau was serving in Jerusalem when the Gulf War started in August 1990. In response to the international coalition’s ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Hussein ordered the firing of ground-to-ground missiles into Israel, especially around the Tel Aviv and Haifa regions.Įven the U.S. They rightfully suspected that Hussein’s threats were legitimate. However, with the Iraqi government already at war and an unpredictable actor at the head of the government, the Israeli government’s fears were elevated.

Soon after his invasion of Kuwait, Hussein echoed his past threats to attack Israel, this time pledging to burn half of the country. diplomatic history, we see that although Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are the Middle Eastern nations most commonly associated with the Gulf War, Israel also felt its effects. After the Iraqi government’s failure to do so, the council implemented a worldwide trade ban with the country. The following day, on August 3, the United Nations Security Council called for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The international community was quick to react. On August 2, 1990, Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait and Iraqi troops immediately started to occupy the small oil-rich country. Their concerns would prove to be justified. Iraq’s newfound military prowess and resentment towards Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (after the two nations refused to forgive $30 million of Iraqi debt) worried the United States and its allies about the actions that Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, was willing to take. As a result of the devastating eight-year conflict in which no side claimed clear victory, Iraq emerged with the fourth-largest army in the world.

Israeli gas mask creepy